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Abstract 
We estimate in this paper a non probabilistic Markovien model of stock prices with an evolutionary selection of 
heterogeneous strategies. It is a model proposed by Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) and improved later by Boswijk 
and al. (2007). Indeed, the latter propose one of the few estimations considering stock markets data, characterized by 
an evolutionary selection procedure of heterogeneous strategies. They estimate the model to annual US stock price 
data from 1871 to 2003. In this paper, we chose to proceed by estimation concerning 27 companies from the CAC 40 
and the composite index corresponding to these 27 companies to avoid the risk of an average effect on adding these 
stocks. In addition, the strategy adopted by an investor can depend on his investment horizon and to verify this 
assumption we chose daily, monthly and quarterly data.
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1.  Introduction 
Estimating heterogeneous models began in 1984 with Shiller who presented a model with 
heterogeneous agents: rational and ordinary. He estimates a proportion of rational investors 
between 1900 and 1983 and finds that this proportion considerably fluctuates between 0% 
and 50%. More recently, Westerhoff and Reitz (2003) estimate heterogeneous agent model 
with fundamentalists and chartists using exchange rate data and find significant fluctuations 
of fundamentalist impact. Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) propose a heterogeneous agent 
model improved later by Boswijk et al. (2007). Indeed, the latter propose one of the few 
estimations  considering  stock  markets  data,  characterized  by  an  evolutionary  selection 
procedure of heterogeneous strategies. They estimate the model to annual US stock price data 
from 1871 to 2003. The estimation results support, on the first hand, the existence of two 
expectation regimes, fundamentalists and trend following; and on the other hand, offer an 
explanation for stock prices run-up. Then we use the considered nonlinear model with the 
purpose  of  studying  investor  behaviour  heterogeneity  in  the  French  stock  market.  We 
consider  two  investment  strategies  and  accordingly  two  extreme  regimes:  chartist  and 
fundamentalist. This choice is justified by many papers which show that they are the most 
observed  behaviours  in  the  markets.  This  is  a  dynamic  model  which  considers  an 
evolutionary  selection  of  investment  strategies  and  a  transition  between  the  two  regimes 
which depends on the last profits generated by each decision rule. 
In  the  following  we  will  present  the  results  of  the  estimations.  The  originality  of  our 
estimation lies in empirical applications founded on the use of individual assets and daily, 
monthly and quarterly data. Indeed, we think intuitively that the use of price index could 
skew our results and this is because of the possible compensation effects between stocks in 
the same index. The use of individual stocks will also allow a clearer vision of speculative 
movements undergone by different companies. On the other hand, considering daily, monthly 
and quarterly data, will allow us to conclude on a possible link between adopted strategy and 
investment horizons. 
 
2.  A heterogeneous agent model 
This model presented by Boswijk et al. (2007), is a reformulation in terms of price to cash-
flow ratio of heterogeneous agent model introduced by Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998). It 
considers two assets: a risky asset and a riskless one. The risky asset pays an uncertain cash-
flow  t D  in each period. We note  t P  risky asset price and r the discount rate.  
We suppose that the agents choose between two beliefs or investment strategies; chartist or 
fundamentalist. We suppose that each agent has a myopic mean/variance demand function 
and that investors have the same risk aversion coefficient and the same variance anticipation.  
The only source of heterogeneity selected relates to the anticipated future return of the risky 
asset. All the agents anticipate the same cash-flows: 
 
  [ ] ( ) t t t D g D E + = + 1 1                                                          (1) 
 
With g the constant dividend growth rate 
Bounded rational agents are thus able to anticipate future dividends. 
The choice by  agents of forecasting strategies  depends on the recent past profits. At the 
beginning of the  t period, profits realized by each kind of strategy at the end of ( 1 - t ) are 
available for all agents.  
The dynamic asset pricing equation is written as follows: 
 
( ) t t t t t t x n x n x R e f f + - + = - - 1 2 1 1
* 1                                           (2) 
1828Economics Bulletin, 2011, Vol. 31 no.2 pp. 1827-1836









1 * , r  the discount rate   
t x  represents the deviation of the observed price/cash-flow ratio from the fundamental ratio,  
1 f and  2 f  parameters characterizing beliefs of the two types agents,  t n  fraction of type 1 
investors. When 1 0 〈 〈 h f , investors anticipate a decrease of the deviation from the fundamental 
value  in  the  future:  they  would  be  thus  fundamentalists.  The  closer  h f is  to  1,  the more 
persistent deviation is expected. If 1 〉 h f , it implies that investors expect an increase in the 
deviation of the stock price through time at a constant speed: these agents would be thus 
chartists or trend followers. 
The fraction of type 1 investor is: 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] { } 2
*
1 3 2 1
* exp 1 1 - - - - - - + = t t t t x R x x n f f b                                (3)   
With  ( )
2 2 * 1 h b b a g + =  and 




β: the transition parameter or the transition speed between strategies  
m: the "fundamental" price/dividend ratio  
Subsequently, this model will be used in order to characterize agent behaviour on the French 
stock market. As  we  have already  announced, the originality of our study is to consider 
individual assets and to distinguish several frequencies in data. 
 
3.  Estimation 
 
3.1 Data description 
We use observations relating to twenty seven companies which are among those belonging to 
CAC40 for a longer period than others, from January 1989 to October 2007.  
We think that the use of individual assets is justified by the fact that not only agents are 
unable to follow the same strategies for companies constituting the same index, but they are 
not  also  the  same  investors  who  hold  various  assets.  Investor  behaviour  would  probably 
depend on the characteristics of each company and those of its industry branch. The index 
study, in this case, would be skewed and would mask situations and movements specific to 
diverse companies. It would be on the other hand interesting to compare results which we 
find for different companies to the situation on the stock market. For this, we initially built an 
index gathering the 27 selected companies
1. We studied investor behaviour for this index and 
we  showed  thereafter  that  the  results  found  for  this  index  are  not  the  same  ones  for  all 
companies  and  thus  the  agent  behaviour  is  indeed  heterogeneous  and  varies  through 
companies.  
In this study, we propose empirical application founded on daily, monthly and quarterly data 
in order to explore the assumption according to which the strategy adopted by an investor can 
depend on his investment horizon. We can think that an investor acting in shorter term would 
be more chartist than fundamentalist. 
 
3.2 Estimation method  
We estimate in this section the parameters ( 2 f 1 f * b ) in model (2) and (3) by nonlinear least 
squares method and more precisely by simplex method. As we stated before, we use daily, 
                                                   
1  To calculate this index and its dividend we balanced stock prices (respectively dividends) 
of each company by stock market capitalization. 
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then monthly and finally quarterly observations of 27 companies from the CAC 40 and their 
composite index that we built and called P27. 
 
3.3 Estimation results 
We retained for the various frequencies of data, Student statistics as well as Akaike selection 
criterion  value  (AIC)  of  equation  (2)  and  Akaike  value  (AICAR  (1))  of  the  linear  model 
AR(1).We  also  estimated  the  coefficient  ) 1 ( AR f   of  this  same  model.  The  linear  model 
corresponds  in  fact  to  the  case  of  agent  homogeneity  i.e.  1 f =  2 f = ) 1 ( AR f .  Using  Wald 
statistics, we compared nonlinear heterogeneous model and linear homogeneous agent model. 
We suppose that the null assumption corresponds to  1 f = 2 f .   
According to the Wald test, the nonlinear model is not always significantly better than the 
linear model. Table I represents, for the three used frequencies, assets proportions for which, 
the nonlinear model is significantly better than the linear model. We thus note that using the 
nonlinear model is better justified for high frequency data. Indeed, the nonlinear model is 
more  significant  than  the  linear  model  for  52%  assets  and  daily  data.  For  monthly 
frequencies,  the  nonlinear  model  is  superior  to  the  linear  model  for  44%  of  assets.  And 
finally, for quarterly data the nonlinear model is superior for only 26% assets.    
We now observe with table II the evolution of agent behaviours according to investment 
horizon.  1 0 〈 〈 h f   corresponds  to  a  fundamentalist  strategy  coefficient.  1 〉 h f   is  a  chartist 
strategy coefficient. When  h f  is not significantly different from 1, there is no adjustment 
with the fundamental value. According to table III, that corresponds to the case of 1.85% 
assets when data are daily, 7.40% assets when data are monthly and 0.00% when data are 
quarterly. It is noted that in the shorter term, even fundamentalist agents who exist in the 
market believe in a slow mean return and in a sort of persistence of the deviation. Indeed, 
coefficients  1 < h f   are  very  close  to  1  and  in  particular  for  daily  data.  For  monthly 
observations, fundamentalist agents believe in a faster return to fundamental values. We pass, 
indeed, to coefficients  h f closer to zero. 
The non adjustment to fundamental value, i.e. when  1 = h f or  h f  is not significantly different 
from  1,  can  be  explained  by  the  existence  of  arbitrage  limits  or  implicit  risk  or  by  the 
existence of transaction costs. It also justifies the nonlinear price dynamics. Indeed, Shleifer 
and Summers (1990) explain why the existence in the markets of "noise traders" can lead to 
deviation of price from fundamental value which are not reduced by the arbitragists because 
of  the  uncertainty  characterizing  these  deviations.  As  indicated  above,  transposed  in 
evolutionary  selection  strategies  model,  we  can  advance  the  assumption  that  expected 
fundamental value is the same for all agents, but that this value in fact is supplied with a 
margin  of  uncertainty  ascribable  to  perception  errors,  which  seems  a  more  realistic 
assumption  than  an  exact  knowledge  of  this  value.  This  implies  that  it  can  be  risky  for 
rational arbitragists to make decisions on the basis of these perceived deviations which can be 
different from truth deviations which are still unknown. Arbitrage gains can be in this case 
insufficient to compensate the risk run by the arbitragists.  As a result, price deviation from 
fundamental value persists. The arbitrage risk is treated in an implicit way.     
The existence of transaction cost can also explain the non adjustment to fundamental value 
when these  costs are higher than expected profits. We must underline previous analyses, 
using  nonlinear  adjustment  models,  like  Bohl  and  Siklos  (2004),  Psaradakis,  Sola  and 
Spagnolo (2004) and Coakley and Fuertes (2006), which show that return to fundamental 
value becomes higher when deviation from this value is significant, and becomes weak or 
non-existent when deviation is weak. These results confirm the existence of a no-arbitrage 
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zone on the stock market which can be allotted to the fact that arbitrage risk prime and 
transaction costs are in total more significant than expected profits. Therefore, there are not 
any more forces allowing prices to adjust to benchmark value.   
We  also  see  the  interest  of  analyzing  individual  asset  price  dynamics.  Indeed,  if  we 
considered for example the portfolio formed by these 27 assets we could not realize that there 
are assets for which fundamentalist strategy is applied in the short term. And, if we refer only 
to  P27  index,  the  market  would  be  governed  only  by  chartists  for  daily  and  monthly 
observations.  For  long  term  observations,  i.e.  quarterly  data,  we  find  exclusively 
fundamentalists.  This  implies  agent  behaviour  heterogeneity  varies  from  an  investment 
horizon  to  another,  whereas  agents  having  the  same  investment  horizon  would  adopt 
homogeneous behaviours. Investors would adopt the chartist strategy for daily and monthly 
investment  horizons  and  the  fundamentalist  strategy  for  quarterly  investment  horizon. 
However, individual asset study disproves this result obtained for a composite index cannot 
thus be generalized for all the assets which constitute it. 
We  will  now  study  the  evolution  of  chartist  and  fundamentalist  proportions  for  each 
investment horizon and for different companies. 
Table III enables us to confirm one of our starting intuitions: Chartist strategy is the dominant 
one in shorter term, while fundamentalist strategy dominates investor behaviour in longer-
term. A thesis which is besides defended also by traditional finance which recommends that 
fundamental value is established in the long run.  
In  the  appendices  below,  we  deferred  the  chartist  fraction  evolution  figures  for  various 
investment horizons and for some companies. We can observe for the diverse companies a 
presence of large fluctuations for some periods which could correspond to bubbles. We notice 
in particular, for most intense and the most known stock market crisis for our study’s period. 
It is also called the technological bubble because it affected mainly technological assets, i.e. 
those of sectors related to informatics and telecommunications. It concerns in priority Alcatel, 
Bouygues  or  Vivendi.  Crisis  concerns  also  sectors  dependent  on  or  in  relation  with 
technological sectors. It comes out from our study, except for some companies, a kind of 
confusion of investors for crisis period. Indeed, for middle term investment horizon, where 
we generally notice the existence of two types of strategies, we distinguish a kind of stability 
of chartist fraction and fundamentalist one turning around 50%. During crisis period (during 
the bubble and at its bursting), agents switch brutally between the two strategies. During 
these  periods,  there  exist  strategy  imitation  phenomena  probably  because  of  the  lack  of 
information. These phenomena can also be explained by the great uncertainty which reigns. 
Indeed,  investors  do  not  rely  on  their  beliefs  any  more.  In  a  state  of  total  uncertainty, 
imitation is imposed as the rational behaviour: copying other strategies becomes a strategy. In 
this  case,  if  the  other  does  not  have  more  information  than  me,  my  position  remains 
unchanged and if they know something, I improve my situation. Even companies which are 
not concerned a priori by the crisis were touched under panic effect of market and investors. 
The bubble which was initially technological is extended to the majority of companies. Let us 
notice that some companies such as Suez, Shneider, Perno Ricard or Air France were not 
affected by the crisis and kept stable chartists proportions in the middle term always around 
50%.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
Boswijk et al (2007) estimate the evolutionary selection model using annual observations of 
the S&P500 index. But agents do not adopt inevitably the same strategies for companies 
constituting the same index. Indeed, investor behaviour depends on the characteristics of each 
company and on its industry branch. The study of index, in this case, would be skewed and 
would mask situations and movements specific to the diverse companies. In addition, the 
1831Economics Bulletin, 2011, Vol. 31 no.2 pp. 1827-1836
   
strategy adopted by an investor can depend on his investment horizon. It is thus interesting to 
treat different horizons. We chose then to estimate this model with individual assets and not 
only with the composite index, to avoid the risk of an average effect on all the assets hiding 
heterogeneous  behaviours  subjacent  with  individual  price  dynamics.  From  a  systematic 
comparison of results obtained according to data frequencies, we also tried to explore the 
assumption implying that agent adopted behaviours would depend on the investment horizon. 
Our study shows that if one referred only to the composite index, market would be governed 
only  by  chartists  for  daily  and  monthly  observations.  For  long  term  observations,  i.e. 
quarterly, we find only fundamentalist. Agents would be thus homogeneous for the same 
investment  horizon  and  heterogeneous  for  different  investment  horizons.  However,  the 
analysis of individual asset often shows agent heterogeneity even for the same investment 
horizon. These results are different from those provided by Boswijk et al. (2007). Indeed, 
with  the  used  data,  the  latter  distinguish  heterogeneous  agents  over  all  period  of  study. 
However  we  noted  situations  of  homogeneity  by  treating  individual  stocks  and  also  by 
considering various investment horizons.  
The last remark relates to the period of Internet bubble. The result was also awaited: the 
confusion of investors during the crisis period with a brutal switch between two strategies. 
This was often the case for the majority of investors. We concluded for this period that there 
are  imitation  phenomena  probably  related  to  the  lack  of  information  and  the  climate  of 
uncertainty. This  result  agrees with what  we  generally observe on the  market during the 
formation and bursting of bubble, when investors do not rely on their beliefs any more. The 
rational behaviour is then imitation because by copying strategies of the others, we think of 
improving our information. 
 
1832Economics Bulletin, 2011, Vol. 31 no.2 pp. 1827-1836
   
APPENDICES   
Tables 
 
Table I: Comparing nonlinear and linear model: 
Frequencies  Superiority of nonlinear model 
Daily  52% assets 
Monthly  44% assets 
Quarterly  26% assets 
Each percentage represents proportion of assets for which nonlinear model is significantly 
better than linear model, with a significance threshold at 10%. For example, for daily data, 
the linear model is better for 14 among 27 assets, i.e. for 52% assets. 
Table II: Compared results according to data frequencies: 
Assets 
Daily data  Monthly data  Quarterly data 
1 f   2 f   1 f   2 f   1 f   2 f  
Accor  1.01  1.02  0.88  1.004  0.62  0.98 
AirFrance  1.05  1.07  0.97  1.05  0.68  1.14 
Air Liquide  1  1.02  0.93  0.96  0.87  0.9 
Alcatel  1.011  1.024  0.86  1.03  0.52  1.22 
Axa  1.01  1.03  0.86  0.94  0.68  0.69 
Bouygues  0.96  1.08  0.99  1.15  0.69  1.24 
CapGémini  0.87  1.15  0.5  1.4  0.73  0.76 
Carrefour  1.011  1.017  0.96  1.018  0.69  1.36 
Danone  1.0108  1.011  0.77  1.11  0.52  1.25 
Essilor  0.99  1.02  0.95  0.97  0.86  0.98 
La farge  1.01  1.02  0.89  0.95  0.87  0.94 
LaGardère  0.88  1.12  0.8  1.02  0.85  0.95 
L’oréal  0.99  1.01  0.91  1.03  0.74  1.21 
LVMH  1.002  1.018  0.5  1.17  0.68  0.78 
Michelin  1.01  1.02  0.94  1.06  0.43  1.11 
Pernod Ricard  1.001  1.008  0.6  1.02  0.63  0.95 
Peugeot  1.007  1.03  0.57  1.44  0.69  1.26 
PPR  0.98  1.05  0.88  1.1  0.68  1.21 
Publicis  0.98  1.03  0.91  1.03  0.79  0.99 
Sanofi Aventis  1.011  1.019  0.94  1.04  0.93  1.04 
Schneider  1.008  1.04  0.03  1.12  0.74  0.9 
Ste générale  0.79  1.025  0.65  1.08  0.58  0.99 
St gobain  1.022  1.024  0.89  0.99  0.76  0.8 
Suez  1.024  1.025  0.55  1.42  0.88  0.95 
Total  0.88  1.15  0.89  1.08  0.76  1.13 
Unibail  1.04  1.05  0.84  1.15  0.67  1.15 
Vivendi  1.007  1.053  0.9  1.03  0.71  0.97 
P27  1.013  1.03  1.005  1.019  0.69  0.98 
This table enables us to compare for each company the evolution of strategies adopted by the 
investors  according  to  their  horizons  of  investment.    h f superior  to  1  indicates  chartist 
strategy and  h f  lower than 1 indicates fundamentalist strategy. 
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Table III: Chartist and fundamentalist fraction with a 10% significant level: 
Data  Companies fraction 
for which  h f >1 with 




for which  h f <1 with 




for which  h f  is not 
significativly 
different from 1 with 
a 10% significant 
level 
Daily  81.48%  16.67%  1.85% 
Monthly  40.74%  51.85%  7.40% 
Quarterly  22.22%  77.78%  0% 
To  calculate  each  agent  type  fraction  for  various  investment  horizons,  we  proceed  as 
following. For example to calculate chartists fraction to 10% significant level (using Student 
statistic) and for daily data, we have 44  h f significantly higher than 1 among 54, we says that 
81.48% of investors on the market adopt chartist strategies. 
 
Figures 
Chartist fraction evolution figure for some companies and different frequencies 
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